20.9.16
Contra o autoritarismo e o populismo
En vindeiras datas vai a haber un referéndum en Italia para mudar a constitución e as regras eleitoráis. Os liberáis italianos son contrarios a proposta que o primeiro ministro M. Renzi quere aprobar nas urnas. Pode que aprendamos algo do debate italiano para posibeis reformas en España.
3.9.16
Non difamedes a economía.
Un setembro máis comeza un novo curso académico e o noso blog retoma a actividade tras o parón de agosto. E xa que iniciamos un novo curso académico convén lembrar algunhas falacias moi extendidas nos nosos días.
Unha falacia moi popular entre a xente nova, incluso entre os estudantes de economía e ADE, é a idea de que a economía é unha disciplina sen contido moral.
Como consecuencia da popularidade desta falacia adoitase presentar aos economistas como persoas frías no que atinxe ao público, persoas que enfatizan os cartos e o sentidiño frente aos argumentos morais cuxas retóricas infunden grandes entusiasmos. Tecnócratas ocupados exclusivamente no resultado final sen ningún sentido do que está ben ou mal.
O mesmo Adam Smith, co que comeza a economía moderna, empeza a sua actividade intelectual no eido da filosofía e posteriormente desplaza a seu interés cara a economía política, mudando o seu interese en ofrecer consellos moráis aos individuos hacia como mellorar as institucións e políticas públicas. Mais este cambio non significou o abandono dun principio moral fundamental que está no nucleo da Economía como disciplina académica: a crenza no valor da liberdade humana. Xa no século XVIII Smith escribiu:
«Every man is, no doubt, by nature, first and principally recommended to his own care; and as he is fitter to take care of himself than of any other person, it is fit and that it should be so. »
que nos ven decir básicamente que cada un de nos é o máis apto para coidar de nos mesmos e non hai ninguna outra persoa, ou institución, que o poida facer mellor.
Adam Smith non foi o único economista que fixo explícita este compromiso coa liberdade. No século XIX John Stuart Mill afirmou:
«The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it. »
No século XX, Milton Friedman defendía que aquela sociedade que situe a igualdade (no senso de igualdade de resultados) por riba da liberdade, acabara sen igualdade e sen liberdade. Ao igual que Friedman moitos economistas atribuenlle a liberdade un valor instrumental, como medio para alcazar outros obxectivos como a igualdade e a prosperidade. Porén ninguen debería ter dúbida que Friedman, Mill e Smith veían a liberdade como un ben fundamental, algo que ten valor en si mesmo. Así é como a liberdade está inserida no núcleo da teoría económica.
A economía moderna tense convertido nunha disciplina moi formal e matemática e isto pode favorecer que se perda de vista que o grande salto da economía tamén é moral, non so matemático.
Nos primeiros cursos de economía ensinamos o suposto de que os individuos poden ordear os seus resultados de menos preferidos a máis e propoñemos unha medida (que chamamos función de utilidade) que sigue as preferencias das persoas. Se por exemplo temos 100 resultados, podemos definir unha función de utilidade asignando 100 ao resultado máis preferido , 99 ao segundo preferido e así sucesivamente. Esta función de utilidad non di nada sobre o benestar do individuo, so é unha forma conveniente de ordear posibeis eleccións da xente. Cando viramos a atención ao benestar é cando facemos o noso gran salto moral. As melloras no benestar ocorren cando hay melloras en utilidade, e isto ocorre cando un individuo escolle unha opción que antes non estaba disponibel. O que queremos decir é que o benestar de alguen se incrementa cando se incrementa o conxunto de eleccións disponibeis. Cando establecemos isto estamos establecendo que o obxectivo fundamental das políticas públicas é incrementar a liberdade de elección dos individuos.
Este principio básico da liberdade en Economía crea unha predilección sobre a interacción humana e o comercio. Para Friedman, o máis importante feito sobre o libre mercado é que non se produce ningún intercambio a menos que todas as partes saian gañando. A defensa que algúns economistas fan do libre mercado non ten que ver necesariamente cunha maior prosperidade senon coa loita polos valores da liberdade e a interdependencia humana.
Os nosos oponentes poden decir que os economistas temos idealizada a liberdade, e cando argumentamos sobre calquera problema podemos estar errados mais o que non poden decir é que navegamos sen estrela polar. A nosa estrela polar é unha crenza fundamental na liberdade.
Porén, a visión de que o libre mercado é un sistema moralmente inferior está moi extendida entre a xente nova e o que é máis sorprendente tamén entre empresarios ricos. Según esta visión a traxedia humana é que alternativas moralmente superiores ao libre mercado, como o socialismo, non son factibeis. Así, o libre mercado debe ser tolerado, é un mal necesario, mais un mal ao fin e ao cabo.
O libre mercado ou capitalismo, así chamado de forma despectiva para tratar de enfatizar o suposto predominio do factor productivo capital sobre outros, parte coa gran vantaxe moral de que os actos entre os individuos son voluntarios. Outras alternativas, como o socialismo, dependen crucialmente da coerción. As veces, afírmase que se ben o libre mercado pode ser aceptable sobre o papel, na prática fai as persoas piores, a codicia fai a xente ruin e todo iso. Tampouco parece ser certo. Unha ollada con mente aberta a historia ou mesmo ás sociedades nas que están vixentes alternativas ao libre mercado suxiren que o capitalismo saca o mellor das persoas. A xustiza social pode requerir máis que un sistema de produción e intercambio, mais abofé que o libre mercado será parte da solución e non parte do problema.
17.7.16
The maid, the clerk, the doctor & their computer: so now, what?
This
article is written together with Eduardo Giménez, Professor of Economics at the
University of Vigo. It is the first part out of four, which will be published
in this blog. The full article will be published in the book
"Automatization" , which will be published by the European Liberal
Forum at the end of the year.

This morning, the newspaper
picks up that, as every year, Shanghai hosts the trade fair CES ASIA for the
consumer technology industry. A company named Bubble Lab presented at the fair
a sophisticated robotic arm capable of preparing tea, coffee, and cocktails. After
the service, it even cleans the table and leaves it spotless. Mr. Shen Li, representing
the company at the fair, says “I do not know if it's true that is going to end
human work, but the fact is that machines can perform ever more complicated
tasks”. So far, computers and computer-controlled equipment have replaced human
labor in a wide variety of tasks. Yet, as well the above anecdote illustrates, technological
developments can widely expand the set of tasks which can be performed by
machines. Many already suspect that all tasks not requiring creativity will be
made in the near future by machines.
Redistribution
Redistribution
A question then arises: in
such event, what shall await all those who do not have the necessary skills,
namely, creativity? The American film Elysium, released in 2013, describes a
dystopian future in which machines perform most tasks. People who have been
replaced by machines barely survive on a degraded planet Earth, while small
elite inhabits an artificial satellite orbiting our planet. The film is just
science fiction. However, you can imagine a society in which a high-skill
minority performs tasks highly complementary for technological capital and
concentrates most of income and wealth, while most people survives by producing
low-price goods in highly automatized productive process (see Cowen (2013)).
We do not pretend to claim that
we shall get to this situation. Nonetheless, thinking a future in which
automatization of productive processes and increasing importance of
non-rivalries give rise to a polarized society can be convenient in order to
consider new and more suitable ways of redistribution. Proposal such as basic income
(Van Parijs (1995)), the distribution of ownership of some productive assets (Paine
(1797), Roemer (1994)), or a negative income tax (Friedman (1968)) should be
discussed, especially the last one. The big challenge comes from combining the
new mechanisms of redistribution with the necessary incentives for prosperity. However, the
advantages of these redistributive proposals should not be ignored because they
would allow reducing direct state intervention in the provision of goods and
services such as education, health, social assistance and social insurance.
Education
Education
An education system which
fosters creativity and provides the suitable knowledge for the new
technological reality is urgently needed in order to successfully meet the new technological
challenges. We know, this is nothing but a vague generalization. However, many authors
have recognized that educational systems suffer from sclerosis. Goldin and Katz
(2008) blame the US educational system for not having sufficiently adapted to
the demands of the new reality and they do it accountable, at least partially, for the
increase in wage inequality in the United States (see also Acemoglu and Autor (2012)).
Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2014) ask for redirecting the educational system from its
focus on reading and mathematics, typical of the industrial era, towards a
broader set of intellectual and personal skills. Even UNESCO held in 2015 a
World Education Forum "Rethinking Education". Thus, this institution
is aware that something is going wrong with the worldwide education systems.
We do not want to be so
presumptuous to pretend to know what changes the education system should exactly
perform. Notwithstanding, we dare to claim our conviction that the inability of
the education system to adapt to new times has a lot to do with state
interventionism. To overcome atrophy, it is required that the state
interventionism in Education decreases. Thereby, new educational alternatives
will arise from competition and the subsequent processes of creative
destruction. Introducing school vouchers would be helpful (Friedman (1955)). Vouchers
already exist in Sweden and Denmark, but not in most of European countries.
However, the school voucher is not enough. The state must give up the tight
control of the education system. Educational innovation will not be possible if
it is subject to the restrictions imposed by a straitjacket.
In a changing world, in
which many workers are at risk of being displaced from their jobs by machines,
it is important to be very aware the needs of recycling of these workers.
Therefore, the reskilling of workers and training support for unemployed are key
issues. Once again, the best way to achieve the objectives in this area is to
abandon the direct state intervention and to allow that the markets work. To
this end, the severance pays should be substituted for periodic contributions
to worker's capitalization funds (the so-called Austrian fund), which could be
used for reskilling, and the unemployed workers should be provided with
training vouchers with which to finance their preferred training courses given
by the provider that they consider most suitable.
Taxes and regulations
Tax systems should also be adapted
to the new technological reality. In many countries, Spain is a good example,
labor incomes are excessively burdened by taxes. If machines and overseas labor
are replacing domestic workers in performing many tasks, labor income can no
longer bear the tax burden. In particular, welfare state funding should not
mainly fall on labor income any longer, as it currently happens in many
countries. The contributions to social security and other charges on labor should
be cut back, as well as more flexible labor relationships should be allowed.
Reducing the tax burden on
labor without a dramatic increase in other taxes, it might be only possible if
welfare state efficiency is improved. This would likely require new
organizational models in public services. Greater individual freedom to choose
and increased competition would help to promote efficiency. Higher
capitalization of the pension systems, accompanied by a higher level of private
participation in their management, a higher weight of the private sector in
providing health services, and a higher private participation in employment
insurances and active employment policies are some directions to improve. Moreover,
substituting machines for workers and the growing importance of new forms of
human capital might affect the birth rate, which would have significant impact
on the pension system.
The market regulations could
hinder innovation. The regulation of GMOs in Europe or the difficulties faced by
the so-called share economy –a silly name, certainly- to enter in
hyper-regulated markets are some examples of how regulation can hinder
innovation. Particular consideration should be given to financial regulation. The
regulation of financial markets should also be cautious. Otherwise, innovative
activities may suffer due to difficulties to be financed. Thus,
eliminating some regulatory barriers and rethinking regulation seems necessary
to face the new technological reality.
Moreover, polarization of
the labor market reflects that large sections of the middle-class may currently
be adversely affected by new technologies, at least in the short term. Everyone
is aware of the importance of the middle class preferences in determining
public policies in a democratic society. The reaction to technological change may
lead, therefore, to successful demands for greater barriers to trade or to
technological adoption, as well as to pressures to implement redistributive
policies in favor of these sections of the middle-class (more public employment
oriented to these sections, for instance). One cannot help thinking that some recent
political processes in Europe follow this logic.
Convergence
Convergence
Information and
communications technologies are expanding and facilitating access to
information (and, thus, to knowledge and technology) to everyone anywhere.
This, together with reduced transport costs and the elimination of political
obstacles to mobility of goods and productive factors, is facilitating
interactions at a global scale and technological adoption by developing
countries. Friedman (2006) asserts that, after the end of the eighties, we are
in a new stage of globalization (which he calls globalization 3.0).
If technological progress is
equalizing opportunities for countries (flattening the world, as Friedman
(2006) likes to say), then one should not be surprised to observe in the near
future the proliferation of spectacular economic miracles and a rapid change in
the geo-economic map. However, the spread of prosperity-promoting institutions
around the world cannot stop. Institutions securing property rights and
ensuring a free and open society are indispensable for innovation and
accumulation. If so, access to information facilitates technological adoption
and, consequently, the rapid convergence of the laggards to the most advanced
will be seen. However, it must be borne in mind the flip side. A country that
rest on its laurels may experience a rapid relative decline.
Democracy
Democracy
Finally, the main problem
that any organization must to solve is to transmit all relevant information to
all concerned agents. The information and communications technologies
facilitate processing and transmitting information. Therefore, the development
of information and communications technologies might induce, in the near
future, institutional changes that would improve the functioning of state.
References
Acemoglu, D. & Autor, D.
H. (2012). What does human
capital do? A review of Goldin and Katz's The race between education and
technology. NBER Working Paper 17820.
Brynjolfsson, E., &
McAfee, A. (2014). The second machine age: work, progress, and prosperity in a
time of brilliant technologies. WW Norton
& Company.
Cowen, T. (2013). Average is
over: powering America beyond the age of the great stagnation. Penguin Publishing Group.
Friedman, M. (1955). The
role of government in education. Economics
and the Public Interest.
Friedman, M. (1968). The
case for the negative income tax: a view from the right. Issues in American Public Policy. Ed. JH Bunzel. Englewood: New Jersy,
111-120.
Friedman, T. L. (2006). The
world is flat: The globalized world in the twenty-first century (pp. 3-543). London: Penguin.
Goldin, C., & Katz, L.
(2008). The race between technology and education. Cambridge, MA: Harvard.
Paine, T. (2004). Agrarian
Justice (1797). In The Origins of
Universal Grants (pp. 3-16). Palgrave Macmillan UK.
Roemer, J. E. (1994). A
future for socialism. Harvard University
Press.
Van Parijs, P. (1995). Real
Freedom for All: What (If Anything) Can Justify Capitalism?. Clarendon Press.
10.7.16
The maid, the clerk, the doctor & their computer: globalization
This
article is written together with Eduardo Giménez, Professor of Economics at the
University of Vigo. It is the first part out of four, which will be published
in this blog. The full article will be published in the book
"Automatization" , which will be published by the European Liberal
Forum at the end of the year.
Offshoring
The development of
information and communications technologies has resulted in a drastic reduction
in both costs of processing information and transmitting it between two any
point on the globe. The production processes do not necessarily have to be
organized locally any more. Now, the possibility of vertical integration is
opened at a planetary scale. This means that the various tasks of a production
process can be located in distant parts of the globe. This process is known as
offshoring.
Of course, this process of offshoring
has a significant impact on international trade. In particular, trade in
intermediate products is gradually becoming increasingly important relative to traditional
trade in final products; much of the recent surge of international trade comes
from middle- and low-countries; and prices of manufactured imports by developed
countries from developing countries are dramatically declining. Baldwin (2011)
argues that we are witnessing since the late eighties to a second type of
globalization characterized by what he called connective technologies, which
are enabling a drastic reduction in the cost of transmitting information (thus
facilitating access to knowledge and global connection of people and
companies), while the previous stage of globalization was driven by a sharp
reduction in transport costs and political barriers to trade.
Figure 1
![]() |
| Source: Baldwin (2011). |
As Blinder and Krueger
(2013) have argued, essentially any job that does not need to be done in person
(i.e., face-to-face) can ultimately be offshored, regardless of whether its
primary tasks are abstract, routine, or manual. With this possibility in mind,
it is not surprising that offshoring –being possible thank to the information
and communications technologies- is affecting differently to the three
characters of our story. The doctor and the maid perform tasks that cannot be offshored,
not yet at least, while the tasks of the clerk are increasingly being offshored.
Therefore, offshoring is also contributing to alter the relative demand of the
different kinds of workers and, consequently, is affecting their relative
wages.
Occupations threatened by
the computer replacement and those under the threat of relocation are not
exactly the same. However, in general, it can be asserted that many occupations
performed by middle-skill workers –workers with high-school or some college education-
are currently confronting both threats. Autor and Acemoglu (2011) report that
(i) offshorability is highest in clerical and sales occupations which imply a
high degree of routine tasks; (ii) offshorability is also high in professional,
managerial and technical occupations, which imply a high degree of non-routine
tasks, and (iii offshorability is relatively low in production and operative
occupations and even lower in service occupations. The measures of offshorability reported by Acemoglu and Autor are roughly consistent with the measures reported by Blinder and Krueger (2013). However, it must be pointed out that there is a large heterogenity into the category "production and operative occupations". According to the estimates provided by Blinder and Krueger (2013), farming, fishing and forestry occupations, construction and extraction occupations, installation, maintenance and repair occupations, and transporting and material moving occupations have a very low degree of offshorability, but other production occupations have a very high degree of offshorability. In particular, according to their best measure, 80% of jobs in other production occupations are offshorable. Offshorability is also very high in office and administrative support occupations, 41% of job in these occupations are offshorables according to the best measure reported by Blinder and Krueger. Offshorability is also high in sales and related occupations (17.8%), professional and related occupations (20.5%), and managment, business, and financial occupations (16.4%). However, the percentage of offshorable jobs in service occupation is only 0.7%. Blinder and Krueger (2013) estimate that roughly 25% of U.S jobs are offshorable. The fith column of Table 1 displays a measure of offshorability of several occupations in 16 European countries elaborated by Goos et al. (2010) (a higher number means higher offshorability).
Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2015) reports that the U.S. local labor markets whose initial industry composition exposes them to rising Chinese import competition experience significant falls in employment, particularly in manufacturing and among non-college workers. Ebenstein et al. (2009) present evidence that globalization has put downward pressure on worker wages through the reallocation of workers away from higher wage manufacturing jobs into other sectors and other occupations. Using a panel of workers, they find that occupation switching due to trade led to real wage losses of 12 to 17 percentage points.
Table 1
![]() |
| Source: Goos, Maning and Salomons (2010) |
Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2015) reports that the U.S. local labor markets whose initial industry composition exposes them to rising Chinese import competition experience significant falls in employment, particularly in manufacturing and among non-college workers. Ebenstein et al. (2009) present evidence that globalization has put downward pressure on worker wages through the reallocation of workers away from higher wage manufacturing jobs into other sectors and other occupations. Using a panel of workers, they find that occupation switching due to trade led to real wage losses of 12 to 17 percentage points.
Superstars
So far, our history has been
about ordinary workers. Maids, clerks, doctors,...we can find thousands.
However, a small number of workers are out of the norm. They are superstars (see
Rosen (1981)), as the soccer players Leo Messi or Slatan Ibrahimovic. In recent
decades, there has been an impressive burst of earnings of this so-special type
of workers.
The income share of the top
1% of income distribution has soared since the late eighties (see Figure 2). At this stage of
XXI century in countries like the United States or Britain, the top 1% income
share is hovering at the figures observed at the beginning of the past century
(see Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011)). In fact, much of the increase in
inequality in income distribution in many developed countries is explained by
the increase in the top 1% (see Bell and Van Reenen (2010)). Keep in mind the
shocking remunerations for the most CEOs of large companies (see Figure 3). Before the
eighties, their earnings were certainly enviable, but did not reach, not even
by far, the stratospheric current figures (see Frydman and Jenter (2010)).
Gabaix and Landier (2006) give an explanation of the increase in CEO earnings
based on the ideas developed below.
Figure 2
![]() |
| Source: Van Reenen (2010). Top 1% share of all income in English speaking countries. |
Figure 3
To understand the relationship between the earnings of the superstars and technical change, consider Luis Suárez, footballer of F.C. Barcelona in the fifties, and Luis Suárez, currently footballer of F.C. Barcelona.[1] In the fifties and sixties, Suárez I, as Suárez II today, produced non-rival goods –shots, dribbling, passing, goals,...- which could be enjoyed by a lot of people at the same time. People paid to see the exploits of Suárez I on the pitch, and now pay for Suárez II’s goals. Suárez I, as Suárez II today, earned a lot of money because a lot of people watched and admired his gaming. However, in the fifties, when Suárez I played soccer, technology only allowed a hundred thousand people to watch Suárez I’s gaming: those people who attended every Sunday to Camp Nou Stadium. Nowadays, millions of people around the globe watch the goals of Suárez II every week on their televisions and millions more may dream of being Suárez II playing on their gaming consoles. More people can currently enjoy Suárez II’s gaming than Suárez I’s in the fifties and sixties thanks to the information and communications technologies. Accordingly, Suárez II’s earnings are much higher than Suárez I ever dreamed.
Moreover, the difference
between Suárez II’s earnings and most players in the Spanish soccer league is
greater than the difference between Súarez I’s earnings and most players in the
Spanish league at those days. In the fifties, football-mad people of Vigo had
to attend Balaídos Stadium to watch R.C. Celta de Vigo matches because they could
not see to play Suárez I every week. They paid their tickets, as the supporters
of F.C Barcelona did to attend Camp Nou Stadium. In the fifties, Barcelona
soccer players earned more money than Celta soccer players because more people
went to watch them, but, not much more. Nowadays, people from Vigo do not need
to attend Balaídos Stadium to watch soccer. They can watch F.C. Barcelona matches
using the pay-perview digital television services and, consequently, Barcelona
soccer players earn much more money than their colleagues of R. C. Celta. This
increase in earning differences is a consequence from that, when people produce
non-rival goods, the winner takes all. In the example, watching soccer in the
stadium is not the same as watching soccer on TV, watching your team is not the
same as watching any other team,…There are several reasons because R.C. Celta
and F.C Barcelona are not perfect substitutes, so that the core idea “winner
takes all” does not work perfectly.
In short, the development of
the information and communications technologies is increasing the degree of
non-rivalry of some goods produced by some economic agents, which allows them
to earn a lot of money if they are the winners of a “winner-take-all” race. This
means that globalization driven by the information and communications
technologies has played an important role in boosting demand for the services
of some superstar workers, which has increased their earnings and income inequality.
References
Acemoglu, D., & Autor,
D. H. (2011). Skills, tasks
and technologies: Implications for employment and earnings. Handbook of Labor Economics, 4,
1043-1171.
Atkinson, A. B., Piketty,
T., & Saez, E. (2011). Top incomes in the long run of History. Journal of Economic Literature, 49(1),
3-71.
Autor, D. H., Dorn, D.,
& Hanson, G. H. (2015). Untangling trade and technology: Evidence from
local labour markets. The Economic
Journal, 125(584), 621-646.
Baldwin, R. (2011). Trade
and industrialisation after globalisation's 2nd unbundling: How building and
joining a supply chain are different and why it matters. NBER Working Paper 17716.
Bell, B., & Van Reenen,
J. (2010). Bankers’ bonuses and extreme wage inequality in the UK. Centre for Economic Performance Special
Report Nº 21.
Blinder, A., & Krueger,
A. B. (2013). Measuring offshorability: A survey approach. Journal of Labor Economics, 31(S1), S97-S128.
Ebenstein, A., Harrison, A., McMillan, M. and S. Phillips (2009). Estimating the impact of trade and ofshoring on American workers using the current populations surveys. NBER Working Paper 15107.
Frydman, C., & Jenter, D. (2010). CEO Compensation. Annual Review of Financial Economics, 2(1), 75-102.
Ebenstein, A., Harrison, A., McMillan, M. and S. Phillips (2009). Estimating the impact of trade and ofshoring on American workers using the current populations surveys. NBER Working Paper 15107.
Frydman, C., & Jenter, D. (2010). CEO Compensation. Annual Review of Financial Economics, 2(1), 75-102.
Gabaix, X. and Landier, A.
(2006). Why has CEO pay increased so much? NBER
Working Paper 12365.
Goos, M., Manning, A., & Salomons, A. (2010). Explaining job polarization in Europe: the roles of technology, globalization and institutions. CEP Discussion Paper Nº 1026, LSE.
Rosen, S. (1981). The
economics of superstars. The American
Economic Review, 71(5), 845-858.
Van Reenen, J. (2011). Wage inequality, technology and trade: 21st century evidence. Labour Economics, 18(6), 730-741.
Van Reenen, J. (2011). Wage inequality, technology and trade: 21st century evidence. Labour Economics, 18(6), 730-741.
[1]
The supporters of Deportivo de La Coruña -hometown of Suarez- had the
opportunity to enjoy the Suárez’s gaming prior to his passage by F.C.
Barcelona. Afterward, Luis Suárez won two European Cups with Inter of Milan. Luis
Suarez is the only Spanish soccer player (Galician, more precisely) winning a
Golden Ball. The homonymous Uruguayan player who currently plays in the ranks
of F.C Barcelona was so named in his honor.





